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The recommendation in this paper will be to design a model where military representatives have greater involvement with U.S. civilian law enforcement in counterterrorism operations within the United States. The U.S. military, specifically Special Operations Forces, possesses a pool of talent in advanced counterterrorism operations that is not being utilized by civilian law enforcement because of the current law enforcement models and the traditional interpretation by the U.S. military of their role in continental United States operations.
Civil Military Cooperation for Counterterrorism Operations within the United States
Let us not forget, the Nation remains at war abroad to defend against and defeat threats to our homeland. Our foremost priority is the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. In the current operational environment, this means each component of our Joint Force will remain aligned to achieve success in our ongoing campaign in Afghanistan and security efforts with Pakistan, and against violent extremism worldwide. We must continue to prevent attacks against the United States and its allies, strengthen international and regional security, and be prepared to deter and defeat aggression that would undermine international stability as we fight these campaigns.
-The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011 1 The Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S.
Law Enforcement Community continue to improve their planning, preparing and training for counterterrorism operations within the United States. "The attacks of September 11, 2001 , as well as the subsequent attempts to contaminate Americans with anthrax, dramatically exposed the nation's vulnerabilities to domestic terrorism and prompted numerous legislative proposals to further [sic] strengthen our preparedness and response." 2 Although there has been an increasing focus on coordination among the agencies responsible for protecting the homeland by the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, there remains opportunity for continued improvement.
The focus of this strategic research project is to identify a model whereby U.S.
military representatives have greater involvement with U.S. civilian law enforcement agencies in counterterrorism operations within the United States. By examining the current environment, issues in homeland security and homeland defense, the current threats, the current U. S. model for counterterrorism, the issue of Posse Comitatus, and Special Operations capabilities, this paper will propose a new model for the way ahead that incorporates members of DOD into the 103 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the U.S.
The citizens of the United States have many expectations related to security and possess great trust that their security will be provided by a team of professionals to which they continue to dedicate their tax dollars. If you were to ask a U.S. citizen what their expectation is, if an aircraft is flown by a suspected terrorist and enters into U.S.
airspace, quite possibly the response from the citizen would be an expectation that a U.S. military aircraft (Air Force/Navy/Marine) would intercept the suspected terrorist and take appropriate action, even destruction, so as to ensure the safety of the American citizens. And if you were to ask a U.S. citizen about another similar situation but change the scenario to a suspected terrorist operating a watercraft entering U.S.
territorial waters, likely you would get a similar response from the U.S. citizen who would have an expectation that a U.S. Navy vessel (or Coast Guard) would intercept and take appropriate action, even destruction, to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens.
Likewise, if a U.S. citizen was asked about a similar terrorist threat in space, quite possibly the response given would be the expectation of a citizen of the U.S. that the U.S. Air Force would be able to mitigate the threat by neutralizing the weapon used by a terrorist in the domain of space. Similarly, if a U.S. citizen were asked about the lesser understood cyber domain, there still rests within the citizen a faith, built on trust, that there exists somewhere in the Department of Defense (DOD) a strategy and capability to mitigate the potential damage that can be inflicted to the U.S. by a terrorist in the cyber domain. Although the cyber domain is the newest and arguably the least 3 understood domain, there exists an abiding faith from the people of the U.S. that the U.S. Military is preparing for a cyber-attack and additionally a faith abides that the DOD is preparing to use technology to give the capability for a cyber-attack by the U.S.
offensively if the need arises for the U.S. In all of the 4 domains mentioned above, air, sea, space and cyber, the citizens of the U.S. and the U.S. Government appear congruent in what the expectations are from the American people and the actual planned response. However, when we add the "land" domain as a proposed scenario we see the expectations of the U.S. citizens still aligned and consistent with an expected military response but the planned U.S. Government response changes. In the land domain, the U.S. Government response to a terrorist attack is more complicated and turns to a more law enforcement-centric approach until specific targets are identified which require the capability of U.S. military weapon systems. There exists a gap in the land domain that doesn't exist in the domains of air, sea, space and cyber.
The expectations of the American people do not change but certainly the U.S.
Government strategy on how to deal with terrorists in a land domain and how we conduct counterterrorism operations is clearly different than our strategy in the other domains.
There are a variety of constitutional, cultural and complex issues related to the U.S. Government's strategy in conducting counterterrorist operations or responding to a terrorist attack within the U.S. The scope of this paper is not to address them all nor the U.S. Government's response to a terrorist attack in the other domains, but to focus on some of the issues involved in counterterrorism operations in the U. Conflict is the norm; a stable peace the exception. In such a world, our adversaries will adapt to gain advantage, especially in the land domain. And it is on land, that our challenges will be the most complex because of dynamic human relationships and terrain variables." 6 A focus on counterterrorism operations on the U.S. mainland, the danger that could exist, and the structure of the force necessary to meet this challenge points us to the DOD's land power which is primarily nested in the United States Army.
By design, just as the Air Force prepares for future threats in the dimension of the air, space & cyber, and the Navy at sea, the Army is responsible for the operations necessary to ensure security on land.
As the DOD and notably, the U.S. Army absorbs future defense funding cuts, as we rebalance towards the Asian-Pacific area, as we complete combat operations in Afghanistan and design the future force for the U.S. Army, the security of the U.S.
homeland remains non-negotiable and we will need to discover new ways and means to address this complex problem. This paper presents an argument for an increased role for DOD and specifically U.S. Army personnel involved in counterterrorism operations for protection of the U.S. homeland.
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The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011 explains that the Joint Force in the land domain, "will be capable of full spectrum operations, and be organized to provide a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a sustainable rotational cycle." 7 A positive side to budget cuts is the requirement to re-examine and restructure the force allowing creativity to be applied to existing and older problems.
The Army has created new and effective ideas when tasked with finding solutions for security as it did after the attacks of September 11, 2001 . The Army needed to transform and become more agile in its response to a national crisis in the U.S. The terms Homeland Security and Homeland Defense are often used synonymously but the U.S. Government has two distinct meanings for their application.
Homeland Security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), "is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist acts within the United States, reduce America's vulnerabilities to terrorism, minimize the damage, and recover from attacks that do occur." 14 The Department of Homeland Security is led by a Cabinet level civilian, currently Secretary Janet Napolitano, whose mission is to secure the homeland. In many situations "the mere presence of DOD assets operating in support of law enforcement along the borders or in the airspace adjacent to our public lands can deter transnational threat actors such as foreign terrorist organizations." 19 It would be unwise to create a picture where all of the U.S. Government planning could be mistaken for seamless execution. History proves otherwise, and there has been great friction not only between government agencies, e.g. law enforcement agencies and DOD, but specifically friction has existed within DOD regarding the limited resourcing for defense for the homeland. DOD has had a past reluctance to take on the civil support mission, considering it a mission to accept when it had the resources available to assist. Perhaps the most significant change for DOD today is the unconventional and unprecedented threat to the U.S. homeland.
There has been significant improvement and continued progress through interagency cooperation, NORTHCOM training exercises, and actual U.S. natural disasters where current experience and "lessons learned" continue to serve as a step on the staircase for the way ahead. After suffering through a brutal terrorist attack in New York City, the Pentagon and numerous natural disasters, the expectations of U.S.
citizens has changed with a demand for a more coordinated federal effort. Currently, once civil authorities have gained approval for their request for assistance, the DOD assists to provide the support. "The DOD can also provide support when directed by the President or the SECDEF, or when authorized under separate established authorities, DOD remains in support of civil authority and generally in support of a primary federal agency." 20 In the future the DOD will remain the lead agency for homeland defense and will continue to provide resources when requested and approved for support of another Federal or State agency. 22 The minds of terrorists are creative and continually developing new strategies to exploit our weaknesses. The minds that developed and executed the 9/11 attacks utilized our security weaknesses against us in a powerful way. The U.S. must place its best assets into the fight in order to prevent a future attack on U.S. soil and preserve our national security. The post 9/11 conventional wisdom for U.S. national security has focused our efforts on prevention, crisis and consequence management.
"At home the United States is pursuing a strategy capable of meeting the full range of threats and hazards to our communities. These threats and hazards include terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber-attacks, and pandemics." 23 One of the primary concerns for the U.S. is the dangerous type of weapons that could be acquired by an enemy nation, non-state actor or terrorist group. "The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more freedom of action to challenge U.S. interests." While prevention is the optimum outcome of all this effort, it is also the most difficult to achieve. In order to prevent a terrorist attack we must identify the terrorist or terrorist group that poses the threat to the U.S. and influence them in such a manner as to ensure their potential to cause harm to the American people is thwarted. In the land 13 domain, this effort is complex, messy and a continual business which is entangled in our constitution, public laws, presidential directives, current policy and not the least of which is U.S. public opinion. In addition, U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts have "forced the terrorists to evolve and modify their ways of doing business." 26 other Salafi-jihadist groups from occurring within the United States that are psychologically significant (i.e., attacks involving tens of casualties or smaller frequent attacks)." 29 The paper states; "Prevention here is understood to pertain not only to the operational phase of an attack but also to attempts to attack-in other words, to precursor activities such as recruiting, training, planning and material acquisition." 30 In order to counter this threat of a terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland, the U.S.
Government will need to question "assumptions" of strategies developed in the past. To take a new and continually fresh look at the threat as it evolves and creatively apply new techniques to counter the ever evolving threat. The real success of this focus will be when measures to prevent the attack have met that challenge and were successful in preventing the attack from ever occurring.
The Current Model
If prevention is the focus for the U.S. Government, then it is proper to evaluate the current model to determine if there is a better design that orients more assets toward the goal of prevention. Notwithstanding the very best effort and intentions of the DOD and law enforcement agencies, the lack of civil military cooperation is a problem. The future will be defined in Afghanistan as it is now in Iraq, where a once large contingent of members of the DOD are gone and with it the interaction with the enemy on foreign soil far away from the U.S. mainland. The enemies of the U.S. will not just fade away; to believe so is to misunderstand the threat and fail to take a realistic look at history. The terrorist networks and enemies of the U.S. will seek the continued confrontation they desire. For this struggle is why they exist and their success in it will be an eternal reward, which is why they continue to seek the confrontation with the U.S.
-whom many terrorist networks deem as their chief enemy. This is not difficult to is an enemy to terrorist networks that normally thrive when weak central governments exist. However, stability in one country does not necessarily guarantee the stability of another. A stable Afghanistan in the years ahead may help to mitigate the threat of terrorist action in the U.S. but it will not reduce it entirely.
As noted earlier, we are likely to face an increase in terrorist activity focused on the U.S. homeland due to the following:
 Terrorist networks will continue to desire a struggle with the United States as the ultimate obstacle to their strategic goals.
 As U.S. military forces are returned home from Southwest and South Asia, the opportunities for terrorist networks to struggle with the U.S. abroad will reduce significantly.
The need for civil-military cooperation in counterterrorism operations has never been greater, and the limited cooperation between the DOD and law enforcement must be improved in this environment. As such, there exists the need for a new model to counter the evolving threat at home.
Posse Comitatus
If there is an overarching causation factor impeding civil military cooperation for counterterrorism operations within the U.S., it is the misapplication of Posse Comitatus.
The DOD deserves a lion-share of the blame as it has historically been so sensitive about applying a military solution in the U.S. that it has practically been absent in the land domain. The DOD is providing Homeland Defense in the air, space and sea domains and quickly becoming the lead for America in the cyber domain, but the DOD is not the primary provider of security for the land domain. That belongs to the DHS until such time DOD is requested to provide assistance because of a need for a specific DOD asset.
In defense of the DOD, they are continuing in a long tradition of respect for the spirit of Posse Comitatus. "This high level of respect is largely contingent on the military being used to protect-and not to control-the American people." 32 The trust between the DOD and the American people is built on a time-honored tradition that has not caused the American people to question if their military will be using its capability against the citizenry. The DOD is careful not to get close to the line that causes the American people concern that the military intends to use its assets against them. Thus, the DOD has been ever ready to claim it can't get involved with anything that resembles law enforcement based on the requirements of Posse Comitatus. "Remember that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power to "provide and maintain" a navy, but only to "raise and support" an army when needed. This reflects a wariness of standing armies arising from the European practice of monarchs using their standing armies not only to wage war, but also to control their own people." homeland security is to build confidence among our partners and be there in support when they ask for it, bringing capabilities and capacities that DOD can provide to help our civilian partners to protect our citizens." 41 forces." 51 For the way ahead, "we will find ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our adversaries." 52 The Joint Operating Environment 2010 publication suggests the nation will be best served by, "a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes." 53 Defense explains, "the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces is to succeed first of all in the mission of 'counterterrorism and irregular warfare' and to accomplish the counterterrorism mission 'we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities for counterterrorism and irregular warfare'." 54 The JTTF is the best framework for DOD to tailor its capabilities for counterterrorism operations.
JTTFs were established in the 1980s and remain FBI led and have grown significantly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. "The JTTFs serve three main purposes: (1) prevent terrorist attacks; (2) respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist- 
Conclusion
"National unity was deemed by Sun Tzu to be an essential requirement of victorious war. This could be attained only under a government which was devoted to the people's welfare." 59 The U.S. government must be devoted to the people's welfare and devise a strategy for future national security. The U.S. Army must participate fully in developing this strategy as the nation's main effort in the land domain. The best design to tailor future U.S. governmental assets for counterterrorism operations within the U.S. is for the Army to assign SOF or other skilled soldiers to the 103 JTTFs across
